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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable 
to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches 
under the jurisdiction of the United States are 
generally subject to a set of rules called the 
Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) (Krider 
etal., 1999; Krider etal., 2006). The LLCC protect 
both the vehicle and the public by assuring that 
the launch does not take place in conditions 
posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the 
ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the 
vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the 
mission while releasing both toxic materials and 
debris.
To assure safety, the LLCC are
conservative and sometimes they may seriously 
*corresponding author address: Francis J. 
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limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as 
scheduled even when conditions are benign. 
In order to safely reduce the number of launch 
scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the 
Airborne Field Mill (ABFM II) program was 
undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed 
to collecting detailed high-quality data on the 
electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological 
properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. 
Details may be found in Dye etal., 2007. The 
expectation was that this additional knowledge 
would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC 
and allow them to be revised to be less restrictive 
while remaining at least as safe. That expectation 
was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the 
LLCC in 2003 and 2005. 
The 2005 revisions included the 
application of a new radar-derived quantity called 
the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar 
Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight 
through anvil clouds. VAHIRR is the product of the 
volume averaged radar reflectivity times the radar-
determined cloud thickness. The reflectivity 
average extends horizontally 5 km west, east, 
south and north of a point along the flight track
and vertically from the 0 °C isotherm to the top of 
the radar cloud. This region is defined as the 
"Specified Volume". See Dye et al., 2006 and 
Merceret et al., 2006 for a more thorough 
description of VAHIRR. The units are dBZ km (not 
dBZ km - ') and the threshold is 10 dBZ km. It is 
safe to fly through an anvil cloud for which 
VAHIRR is below this threshold everywhere along 
the flight track as long as (1) the entire cloud 
within 5 nmi. (9.26 km) of the flight track is colder 
than 0 C, (2) the points at which VAHIRR must be 
evaluated are at least 20 km from any active 
convective cores and recent lightning, and (3) the 
radar return is not being attenuated within the 
Specified Volume around those points. 
Analysis of the ABFM data has continued, 
and two additional revisions to the LLCC were 
proposed in late 2006. One proposal was to apply 
the VAHIRR concept to debris clouds, and the 
other was to reduce the distance outside of anvil 
and debris clouds within which a vehicle is not 
permitted to fly. This is referred to as the "stand-off 
distance" in the rules. This paper discusses these 
proposed changes in the LLCC and the scientific 
rationale for adopting or rejecting them based on 
ABFM II data. Formal adoption or rejection of 
these proposed LLCC changes is expected in the 
spring of 2008. 
2. REDUCING STAND-OFF DISTANCES FROM 
ANVIL AND DEBRIS CLOUD 
The LLCC not only forbid flight through 
potentially dangerous clouds, but also limit flight in 
their immediate vicinity unless certain restrictions 
are met. The goal is to avoid flight through fields 
greater in magnitude than 3 kV m 1 . The distance 
within which a launch operator may not fly without 
meeting these restrictions is referred to in this 
paper as the "stand-off distance". In many of the 
LLCC, the stand-off distance is five nautical miles 
(9.26 km). Based on the ABFM II measurements 
reported in Merceret et al., 2008, it has been 
proposed to reduce this to 3 nautical miles (5.52 
km) as summarized below. 
The fields in anvil clouds penetrated by 
the ABFM II aircraft became smaller than 3 kV m 
inside the perimeter of the cloud even though 
fields deeper in the anvil sometimes exceeded 
tens of kV m 1 . External to the cloud perimeter, 
fields were typically smaller than 1 kV m 1 . Figure 
1 (Figure 4 from Merceret et al., 2008) shows
electric field magnitude as a function of distance 
from the edge of anvil clouds that had a maximum 
field magnitude of at least 3 kV m 1 . The 
maximum and average values are shown 
separately for passes entering cloud and exiting 
cloud. The hazard threshold of 3 kV m 1 is shown 
by a horizontal dashed line. The cloud boundary is 
at distance = 0 with cloud on the left and clear air 
on the right. The behavior of debris clouds is 
essentially identical (not shown). 
These data encompassed penetrations of 
18 anvil clouds and 11 debris clouds. With a 
sample size this small, a careful statistical analysis 
is required in order to estimate the probability that 
fields greater than the 3 kV m 1 limit will be 
encountered beyond any proposed reduced stand-
off distance. This probability must be small 
(typically 10-4or less) in order to justify a rule 
change. 
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Figure 1. Figure 4 from Merceret et el., 2008. See 
text for description. 
The sample size was too small for a 
standard extreme value analysis, so three 
alternative approaches were used. All indicated 
that a reduction of the standoff-distance to 3 n. mi. 
(5.52 km) is sufficiently safe. 
The easiest but least rigorous method was 
an a fortiori argument as follows, but the argument 
only applies to anvils: 
If the VAHIRR quantity is below the 10 dBZ km 
threshold provided in the anvil rules, it is safe to fly 
through the anvil. Outside the anvil there is no 
radar echo at all, so the VAHIRR quantity, if 
computed beyond 3 nmi. (5.52 km) outside the 
cloud, would be zero, which is certainly less than 
the threshold of 10 dBZ km. That would be safe
even within the cloud, so, a fortiori, it is certainly 
safe outside the cloud. 
The a fortiori argument may be logically 
sound, but it is not quantitative and it does not 
apply (yet, at least) to debris clouds since VAHIRR 
has not yet been incorporated into the debris cloud 
rules. This led to two statistical approaches. 
The first approach was an application of 
Gaussian statistics. The current stand-off distance 
from which any change would be made is 5 n. mi 
(9.26 km) and the proposed relaxation is to 3 n. 
mi. ( 5.52 km). The analysis was designed to 
examine the risk involved in flight through the 
region between the existing and the proposed 
limit. The available data in this region covered the 
range from 6 to 12 km. Data from anvil and debris 
clouds were combined to maximize the sample 
size since their behavior was essentially identical. 
An exploratory analysis was conducted to 
determine possible probability distributions that 
would yield conservative quantitative results. All 
data in the range from 6 to 12 km were combined 
for the analysis. Table 1 presents the results. 
Table 1. Statistics of combined anvil and debris 
cloud in the range 6 - 12 km from cloud edge. 
Fields are in kV m 1 . Kurtosis is defined such that 
the kurtosis of a Gaussian distribution is 3.0. 
The table shows that the skewness is 
nearly zero and the kurtosis is smaller than for a 
Gaussian distribution. This suggested that a 
Gaussian distribution would be a conservative fit 
to the data since it would have broader tails 
(hence more extreme values) than the measured 
distribution. Figure 2 shows the measured data 
overlaid on a Gaussian distribution with the same 
mean and standard deviation.
Gaussian Model and Data 
( MS ) • 6lo 12 
Figure 2. The cumulative probability distribution in 
normalized standard deviations for the 6 - 12 km 
electric field magnitude data (V/m) and the 
Gaussian model having the same mean and 
standard deviation. 
-- L
To provide conservatism and margin in the 
risk analysis, the probability computations were 
based on the assumption of a Gaussian 
distribution with a mean given by the measured 
mean plus three times the error of estimate of the 
mean. Additional conservatism and margin were 
provided by using a standard deviation given by 
the measured standard deviation plus three times 
the error of estimate of the standard deviation. 
Thus the parameters of the distribution used for 
the risk analysis are both "three sigma worst case" 
parameter values, Mw = 687 and Sw = 266. The 
results are presented in Table 2. The 0.00E+00 
entry represents a probability too small for Excel to 
handle. 
	
E-field (kV m 1 )	 Model Probability 
	
0.1	 9.86E-01 
0.2 9.67E-01 
0.5 7.60E-01 
1.0 1.20E-01 
1.5 1.12E-03 
2.0 3.95E-07 
2.5 4.60E-12 
3.0 0.00E+00 
Table 2. Probability of exceeding the specified 
electric field magnitude for a Gaussian model with 
a mean of 0.687 kV m 1
 and a standard deviation 
of 0.266 kV m1. 
Although this analysis was consistent with 
the qualitative assessment from the a fortiori 
argument and suggested that there was ample 
safety margin for reducing the stand-off distance 
as suggested, use of a Gaussian assumption is 
not standard for quantitative analysis of extreme 
Quantity Value Standard Error 
Samples 74 N/A 
Minimum field 0.212 N/A 
Maximum field 1.004 N/A 
Median field 0.589 N/A 
Mean field 0.613 0.025 
Field std.dev. 0.213 0.018 
Skewness -0.09 0.28 
Kurtosis 2.22 0.57 
Coef. of variation 0.35 N/A
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values, so an additional analysis was performed 
looking at the distribution of the upper tail of the 
distribution only. 
Exploratory analysis showed that a two-
parameter Weibull distribution fit very well. The 
analysis treated data at each distance outside the 
cloud separately and computed the probability of 
exceeding 3 kV m 1 at each distance. Table 3 
presents the results. 
Table 3. Probability of exceeding 3 kV m 1 as a 
function of distance outside the could boundary. 
The column labeled "all clouds" used data from all 
clouds in the sample. The column labeled "Clouds 
> 3 kV m 1 " only considered samples from clouds 
where the magnitude of the electric field reached 
at least 3 kV m 1 . The format "8.0 E-9" means 8.0 
x 10. Source: O'Brien and Walterscheid, 2007. 
All three analyses support the safety of the 
proposed reduction of the stand-off distances, and 
it is expected that this will be implemented in the 
next revision to the LLCC. 
3. APPLICATION OF VAHIRR TO DEBRIS 
CLOUD
The debris cloud rules are similar in 
purpose and effect to the anvil cloud rules. In both 
cases, the concern is that the parent thunderstorm 
that produced the cloud had deposited enough 
electric charge in the cloud to pose a threat of 
triggered lightning if a launch vehicle penetrates 
the cloud. The rules require the launch operator to 
wait a sufficient amount of time for that charge to 
dissipate before flight through the cloud is 
permitted.
The ABFM data suggest that the electric 
fields in anvil and debris clouds are similarly 
bounded when the VAHIRR quantity is below the 
10 dBZ km threshold used in the VAHIRR-based 
anvil cloud rules. VAHIRR was not previously 
incorporated into the debris cloud rules because 
the required statistical analysis had not been 
performed to quantitatively confirm the strong 
qualitative impression. An unpublished extreme 
value analysis of the ABFM anvil cloud data had 
shown that the probability of exceeding 3 kV m1 
was less than 10-4 
 
when VAHIRR was less than 10 
dBZ km (Dr. Harry Koons, private communication). 
If this relationship also holds in debris cloud, then 
a VAHIRR-based debris cloud rule may be 
justified.
The analysis used for anvil clouds was not 
used for debris clouds because the sample size 
was too small. Instead, the data sequences were 
decimated to reduce the effects of serial 
correlation and then combined into a single 
collection that contained all electric field 
measurements from the decimated set where 
VAHIRR was within +1- 5 dBZ km of the 10 dBZ 
km threshold used for anvils. The data in this 5 - 
15 dBZ km "bin" were examined for candidate 
probability distributions. Again, the Weibull 
distribution was an appropriate fit. For comparison, 
anvil clouds were subjected to this same analysis. 
Data from both the WSR74C and NEXRAD radars 
were used to derive VAHIRR, and they did not 
always give exactly the same result, so they were 
analyzed separately and then combined. Details 
are presented in O'Brien and Walterscheid, 2008. 
Table 4 presents the results. 
Table 4. Probability of exceeding 3 kV m 1 for 
debris and anvil clouds from the Weibull analysis 
of decimated data for VAHIRR between 5 and 15 
dBZ km. The columns with the "95" suffix are the 
95% confidence bound of the estimate. 
This analysis gives higher risk probabilities 
for anvils than the one by Dr. Koons cited above, 
but his methodology was more rigorous. Although 
the smaller sample size for debris clouds 
prevented using the more rigorous methodology, 
the comparison strongly supports the proposition 
Distance 
(km)  
All Clouds Clouds > 3 kV m1 
0.6 8.0 E-9 1.9 E-9 
1.8 2.5 E-9 2.3 E-1 1 
3.0 1.6 E-10 5.9 E-11 
4.2 4.5 E-10 2.4 E-10 
5.4 2.9 E-12 <1.0 E-16 
6.6 1.2 E-12 <1.0 E-16 
7.8 1.6 E-12 <1.0 E-16 
9.0 9.3 E-11 <1.0 E-16 
10.2 9.3 E-11 <1.0 E-16 
11.4 6.5 E-10 <1.0 E-16 
12.6 1.1 E-16 <1.0 E-16
Radar Debris Debris95 Anvil AnviI95 
WSR74C 1.1 E-22 4.0 E-5 5.7 E-3
NEXRAD 2.7 E-126 7.0 E-8 4.0 E-3 =E- 
combined 1.5 E-25 5.0 E-6 2.0 E-3
that use of VAHIRR in debris clouds will be at 
least as safe (10-4 ) as its use in anvil clouds with 
the same threshold. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The proposed changes to the LLCC 
discussed above should provide additional relief 
from launch scrubs and delays due to violation of 
the LLCC while maintaining a high level of safety 
as provided by the current version of the rules. 
This translates directly into reduction of cost and 
delay of spaceflight operations. 
This paper has focused only on two major 
proposed changes to the LLCC that have the 
direct potential to significantly and safely reduce 
the number of unnecessary launch scrubs and 
delays. There are additional changes under 
consideration that were not discussed above, 
primarily because they do not change the 
substance of the LLCC. Instead, they either clarify 
existing definitions or remove ambiguities within 
the LLCC or associated definitions and notes. 
Some additional potential applications of VAHIRR 
to portions of the anvil or debris cloud rules are 
also under discussion, but have not yet reached 
the degree of maturity appropriate to formal 
presentation in a conference paper. 
Among the revisions to definitions are 
several revisions to the definition of VAHIRR. 
VAHIRR is not to be computed when any part of 
its "Specified Volume" lies within the "Cone of 
Silence" of the radar. A specific definition of 
"Cone of Silence" will be provided in the next 
revision. In addition, in order to assure that the 
volume average used to compute VAHIRR is 
statistically stable, the definition of VAHIRR will be 
amended to require that a certain minimum 
possible fraction of the Specified Volume be 
occupied by radar echoes for a valid VAHIRR 
computation. That fraction is still under discussion 
but will most likely be no less than 5% and no 
more than 10%. 
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